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‘Financialization’ is an increasingly significant phenomenon. Its impact has been analysed 
across disciplines (Van der Zwan, 2014), from the perspectives of political economy (Epstein, 
2005), cultural economy (Du Gay and Pryke, 2002) and in terms of workplace and management 
practices (Froud et al., 2006). More recently the literature has considered how financialization 
is operationalised in organisations and the impacts on workers who experience the redefinition 
of work objectives (Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2009), intensification of work (Alvehus and 
Spicer, 2012) and as a result growing feelings of anger (Cushen, 2013). Studies have 
emphasised, in particular, that careers are reconfigured by financialised priorities, through the 
heightened risk of redundancy (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000), revised career paths (Ackroyd 
and Muzio, 2007), and promotion defined primarily by financial performance measures 
(Alvehus and Spicer, 2012).  
 
This article adds to the growing understanding of the organisational processes of 
financialization by examining how professionals in a legal firm experience and respond to 
financialised management and the effects on their careers. The empirical analysis uncovers a 
growing fear and anxiety associated with the risk of ‘failed’ careers. Contrary to other studies 
(Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2008; Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd, 2003), we find professionals 
unable to assimilate managerialism and scrutiny by numbers to further their interests. 
Specifically, drawing on the career as a ‘project of the self’ (Grey, 1994), we argue the 
metricised practices of the firm create a process of performance review for even the most senior 
partners, requiring them to continuously maintain or improve performance just to ‘stand still’ 
in their career. Further, they engage in continual career protection rather than development in 
response to anxiety about the future. This implies professional work and careers in financialised 
organisations have been fundamentally reconfigured by the disciplinary effects of financial 
technologies deployed, with the assimilation noted in earlier periods being replaced by capture 
whereby professionals are subordinated in pursuit of their career projects.  
 
This article begins with an outline of the nature of financialization, its manifestation within 
organisations and impact on professionals. We then clarify our conceptual base, using the 
‘project of the self’ as our starting point. Methodology follows, before the presentation of 
findings. We conclude by discussing the implications for understanding and theorisation of the 
financialization of professional work and careers.  
 
Financialization, professional work and career 
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Financialization 
‘Financialization’ reflects the increased significance of financial markets, actors and motives 
in contemporary society (Cushen, 2013, following Epstein, 2005). In short, the logics of capital 
markets have inserted themselves into many aspects of life (Van Der Zwan, 2014), notably 
processes of organising (Froud et al., 2000, 2006). The phenomena can be conceptualised in a 
variety of ways but we take a cultural economy perspective, seeing financialization as taking 
shape through financial and management discourses, located in social and material practices 
(Du Gay and Pryke, 2002). Such discourses and practices call forth and shape individuals as 
financial beings, reconstructing their subjectivity as self-disciplined ‘investor’ subjects 
(Langley, 2008) or ‘two-legged cost and profit centre[s]’ (Blackburn, 2003, p. 39; in Allen and 
Pryke, 2013). 
 
The impacts of financialization on organisation members themselves is under-explored when 
compared to impacts on organisational structures, but within the labour process evidence 
suggests disadvantageous consequences for employees. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) argue 
‘downsize and distribute’ agendas place workers at constant risk of redundancy, de-investment 
in training and thus precarity. Cushen and Thompson (2016) show that financialization: 
squeezes labour costs and revenues; drives restructuring that increases work insecurity and 
intensification; fosters punitive performance management processes; and reinforces market 
discipline. Cushen (2013) writes about the performative nature of accounting as one part of 
financialization, performativity referring to the way in which a measure or model operates to 
bring about the thing it purports to describe, creating a new reality (Callon, 1998). Cushen 
(2013) draws our attention to how, with reference to organisations, management are 
encouraged to create a strategic narrative that links organisational success to meeting 
financialised targets. Accounting is performative because it proffers the choice of measures, 
undertakes the work of measuring, and drives the performative interventions that follow, such 
as redundancies, the imposition of cost controls and forced outsourcing, thus acting to bring 
about a financialised regime within the organisation (Miller and Power, 2013). There are many 
examinations of such performativity of accounting (for example, Cooper and Hopper, 2006; 
Miller and Power, 2013), but there is scope to expand our understanding of the effects of 
financialised regimes on work and, as specifically relevant here, professional work. In so doing 
we can articulate theoretical categories of worker responses which highlight the negative 
outcomes of financialization for both professionals and organisations.  
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Professional work 
The relationship between professional work and managerial regimes of control has been 
explored in a variety of contexts. The antecedent of discussions of financialization in 
professional service firms (PSFs) was the rise of the ‘managed professional business’ (MPB) 
in the 1990s (Cooper et al., 1996). More recently, studies have documented a shift within firms 
from professional fiduciary to commercial market logics (Smets et al., 2012). ‘Logics’ here 
refers to the assumptions, values and beliefs, and related symbols and practices, associated with 
institutions such as the market and professions (Thornton et al., 2012). Whereas the market 
would be associated with the self-interested pursuit of ever increasing profits and thereby the 
creation of shareholder value, a profession would be associated with reputation and trust built 
on collegiality, autonomy, expertise and an ethos of public service (Thornton et al., 2012).  This 
has provoked questions about impacts on the autonomy and trust traditionally seen as hallmarks 
of professional work (Haug, 1975), to the extent that Farrell and Morris (2003) refer to 
‘persecuted professions’. Underlying this is an assumption that a shift in ‘archetype’ from a 
professional partnership to a managed and financialised business erodes the distinctive ability 
of professionals, and partners in PSFs in particular, to define the means, ends and assessment 
criteria for their work (Brock et al., 1999). 
 
A counter-argument is that professional workers have an uncanny ability to remain prestigious. 
Freidson (1984) suggested that professional groups restratify as they respond to and assimilate 
management changes to protect their own interests. In short, professionals engage with and 
foster managerial regimes to produce a new settlement that mitigates the detrimental effects on 
professional work. For example, Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd (2003) argue professionals exert 
agency to subvert managerial initiatives, while Faulconbridge and Muzio (2008) outline a 
model of ‘organisational professionalism’ that involves concessions to managerialism while 
maintaining the distinctive ability of professionals to control the means, ends and assessment 
of work. This raises an intriguing theoretical question: Do theories of professional assimilation 
remain valid in the latest phase of financialised management? Existing studies of the effects 
of financialization on professional careers provide a starting point for addressing this question.   
 
Professional careers in an era of financialization 
Studies documenting the rise of the managed professional business (Cooper et al., 1996) and 
latterly the financialised PSF (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2009) highlight fundamental shifts in 
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career trajectories as one of the leitmotifs of the financialised firm. Whereas promotion to 
partnership (the most senior position in the organisation) was associated in the 1980s and early 
1990s with peer review, contribution to the collective and time served, more recent periods 
have seen an emphasis on the financial assessments of contribution (Galanter and Henderson, 
2008). This is particularly notable in law firms, the empirical focus of this article. Recent work 
highlights how cultural ‘glue’, previously thought to bind partners to the firm and one another 
(Ouchi, 1980), has been replaced by economic ties (Galanter and Henderson, 2008). Profit 
sharing status is no longer obtained by reference to knowledge and accomplishments but by 
economic contribution, and partners retain that status only so long as they remain ‘rainmakers’ 
or ‘stars’ that secure significant income for the firm (Galanter and Henderson, 2008).  The 
‘tournament’ between professionals for the goal of partnership, previously the final mark of 
career success (Galanter and Palay, 1991), now lasts for a professional’s whole career, such 
that partners exist with the continuous threat of de-equitisation or removal (Galanter and 
Henderson, 2008). These changes have the potential to transform the experience of being a 
partner and raise important questions about how partners respond to such pressures. 
     
In response to recent developments, one body of scholarly work examines how professionals 
have assimilated the discourses and practices of financialization. Cushen (2013) finds 
financialization manifests as budget interventions and financial targets that managers and 
workers are expected to meet, resulting in work intensification, a suppression of voice and 
feelings of anger. Yet employees ultimately participate in the process that subordinates them 
to further their career interests. Alvehus and Spicer (2012) examine controls in a Big Four 
accountancy firm, finding work increasingly quantified and monitored through ‘billable hours’. 
However, employees see billable hours as an investment that is future convertible into career 
progression and the attainment of partner status. This work suggests, then, that like in previous 
rounds of managerialisation (Cooper et al., 1996; Thomas and Hewitt, 2011), professionals 
adopt and adapt to maintain their interests within a new disciplinary system. 
 
Another body of work, which can contribute to our understanding of how professionals have 
assimilated the discourses and practices of financialization, considers how professional careers 
become a project of the self (Grey, 1994). Grey (1994) writes of ‘the career’ as an organising 
or regulative logic, wherein the project of the self constitutes part of the labour process 
discipline. Career is a ‘technology’ that makes possible a project of becoming within an 
organisational context. As Grey (1994) argues, career places the self in a temporal vector: the 
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past self; the present self in his/her organisational context; and the future self of imagined and 
perhaps dreamt of ambitions. Financialization places the professional ‘self’ in a calculative 
context in order to work out what is required for progression or, as some commentators assert, 
to correct the ‘identity deficit’ that stems from the continued aspiration for career achievement 
(Karreman and Alvesson, 2009). Costas and Grey (2014) expand on this temporal and identity-
based theme by considering how professionals respond to disciplinary power through their 
‘imaginary future’ selves, suggesting professionals may imagine an escape from disciplinary 
regimes through a fantasy that the corporate, calculative projects of the self will end. Thus, 
rather than internalising the future professional self as envisaged by the disciplinary system, 
they might hope for a future outside of this regime, either within an area of the organisation 
that is not subject to the regime, or outside of the organisation.  
 
Existing studies highlighted in our review raise a series of important questions. How do 
partners respond to financialised management? Have partners assimilated financialised 
management in ways that allow them to protect their interests? What are the implications for 
how we theorise the professional work within financialised organisations? We address these 
questions through an in-depth ethnographic study of the work and career projects of partners 
in a substantial UK law firm. 
 
Methodology 
 
The Case Firm 
This article is based on data from an ethnographic case study of a UK ‘top 100’ law firm 
operating from multiple offices in a UK region, which is given the pseudonym ‘Henley 
Benson’. It is one of the largest firms in the region measured by reference to turnover, profit 
and total number of lawyers. Its structures of governance and operations included the 
appointment and delegation of executive authority to a Chairman and Managing Partner 
(collectively the ‘senior management’), each previously a partner for more than 15 years. 
Having a strong record of accomplishment of growth in turnover and profit, they had recently 
been re-elected without challenge and considered secure in their positions. They chaired both 
strategy and operations boards, and a remuneration committee. A departmental and divisional 
structure grouped lawyers under specialisms, each with a partner as head responsible for 
‘reporting up’ and enacting board decisions. Functional management provided support, and the 
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Finance and Human Resources Director sit on the operations board, providing monthly reports 
on financial performance and HR matters.  
 
The firm’s vision was to be the ‘top commercial law firm’ in the region.  Although ‘top’ was 
recognised as a nebulous concept, being ‘top’ was equated by senior management with being 
in the top three of a chosen regional peer group, determined by revenue, profit and number of 
lawyers, as well as the number of tier one rankings in independent ‘ranking’ directories. The 
firm’s strategic plan included targets for growth in revenue, top equity profit, and profit margin, 
with progress towards meeting each target divided over sub-periods within the timescale of the 
plan. The firm’s annual budget was set with reference to the goals of revenue and profit growth, 
and divisional budgets driven to achieve these budgets. Partners received comparative monthly 
reports of partner and divisional financial performance across a range of financial metrics.  
Further, they were required to report billing generation and related metrics as part of their 
annual appraisal. These processes were regarded as underpinning the achievement of 
individual, divisional and firm financial targets.  
 
Partners in Henley Benson are ‘members’ within a limited liability structure (known as an 
‘LLP’), the most common form of organising a UK PSF. Of the partners, approximately 20% 
were women. Two classes of partner existed: ‘fixed share’ and ‘equity’.  Fixed share partners 
received a fixed annual profit share while equity partners split the balance of profits in 
accordance with a points system (‘lockstep’). Lockstep operated as a profit sharing ladder, with 
new equity partners starting on the lowest rung and climbing annually until reaching ‘top 
equity’.  Hence, in terms of career progression, appointment to partnership was not the last step 
as it might appear to the outside world.  Rather, a further status hierarchy existed between fixed 
share and equity partners, and then between equity partners with reference to their place on 
lockstep. A remuneration committee comprising senior management and three elected partners 
had the remit to review partner equity positions every two years, with the power to allow or 
halt progression, and to pull partners down lockstep. Reports of financial performance were, 
as we outline below, fundamental to the assessments made by this committee. These features 
of the careers of partners in Henley Benson make the firm an ideal case to investigate the 
partner experience of financialization. In order to protect the identity of respondents their 
names have been changed, and in some cases gender reversed. As such, gendered conclusions 
should not be drawn from the names adopted. 
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Methods 
Data were gathered, over thirteen months, through observation, documentary review, 
interviews and ad hoc meetings. Observations were of meetings of the strategy and operations 
boards, partner meetings, divisional meetings, partner reviews, training sessions and informal 
gatherings, mostly attended in person or on occasion by conference phone. Notes were taken 
at formal observed events and promptly transcribed. Informal events were written up after the 
fact using ‘headnotes’ (Tracy, 2013). In total, there were 244 hours of observation. 
 
Forty-two semi-structured interviews were also conducted. Table 1 lists interviewees, 
representing a spread of functional managers and partners (including some with management 
responsibilities). In choosing respondents appreciation was given to the fact ‘good’ informants 
may be ‘marginal’, outsiders who understand but in some way stand outside the culture (Davies 
2008). 
 
{Table 1 here} 
 
Some interviews and ad hoc discussions were conducted with participants in major events soon 
after their occurrence, for example, remuneration committee members after it had sat, and 
partners’ conference attendees after it had occurred, ensuring fresh recollections. Each 
interview lasted between one and two hours (on average 1.5 hours), and was audio recorded, 
resulting in 64 hours of data subsequently transcribed by the interviewer. Key documents were 
also accessed, including those in Table 2, informing interviews and discussions, and adding 
depth to our understanding of practices and discussions. 
 
{Table 2 here} 
 
Data were stored in MAXQDA. Data analysis was initially limited to writing memos where 
observations, personal reactions and unresolved thoughts were recorded (Emerson, Fretz and 
Shaw, 1995).  After four months in the field, a long list of emerging themes was drawn up and 
coding commenced. Coding began with first level analysis of the ‘utterances’ observed, in 
documents and recorded in interviews. This then proceeded by going back and forth between 
the data and the literature to develop theoretical codes (Matthews and Ross, 2010). A series of 
thematic empirical accounts were then drawn up with reference to theoretical codes, focusing 
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on the effects of financialization on: (a) firm strategy and definitions of success; (b) firm 
governance; (c) the development, appointment and progression of the partners; (d) partner 
review and remuneration processes; and (e) the experience of partners and management of each 
of the foregoing. In this article we draw on these thematic accounts applying the lenses of work, 
career and metrics in the financialised PSF. Firstly, we consider metrics and their disciplinary 
effects. Secondly, we review partner experiences, highlighting fear and anxiety. Thirdly, we 
narrate career protection strategies undertaken by partners and show how these contradict 
professional logics. Finally, we draw conclusions and introduce areas for further research. 
 
Work, career and metrics in the financialised PSF  
 
Metrics and their disciplinary effects 
Driving the financialization of Henley Benson was the crafting, by senior management, of a 
narrative of strategic purpose (Froud et al., 2006). This connected firm success with its relative 
position compared to peer group in externally produced rankings derived principally from 
measures of annual revenue. The firm’s annual revenue budget was driven by a desire to 
achieve significant year-on-year revenue growth to pursue improvements in rankings. 
Divisional budgets were set to meet cumulatively that goal while ‘stretching’ those in each 
division to achieve higher performance. Performance against firm and divisional budgets was 
circulated monthly to partners, and a principal subject at divisional partner meetings. The drive 
to achieve budget was ever present in divisional discussions, as illustrated by the following 
exchange: 
 
Donald: What's the prediction [for making budget] with four months to go? 
Kyle {Division Head}: I've said it will make it. No other answer was acceptable. No 
wasn't cutting it! 
Donald: Okay, okay, stop punching me! 
 
Each divisional budget comprised the total billings of divisional partners; hence partner billings 
were circulated to same end.  The firm’s Finance Director, Brian, explained: 
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The stats that go to the individual partners will show their [billings]… as a matter 
manager, their profitability, their recovery level.  And they get it across the firm so they 
can compare themselves with people in their own division but also the other divisions… 
 
Hence whereas chargeable hours was a key metric in Henley Benson for non-partner lawyers, 
a different set of metrics was promoted for partners, namely total billings, and profit and 
recovery levels, something subsumed under the term ‘matter manager’. Specifically, ‘matter 
manager’ was a term derived from Henley Benson’s practice management system and had two 
meanings. Firstly, files for specific client work (known as ‘matters’) were opened in a single 
partner’s name (he known as the ‘matter manager’). Secondly, the term was shorthand for the 
total billings derived in the year from those files (or ‘matters’), such total attributed to that 
partner as “his matter manager”. Profit and recovery levels were then calculated with reference 
to those files. 
 
Financialization therefore manifested in a linear sequence. Firstly, financial targets were set at 
the firm level on an annual basis. Secondly, those targets were split between divisions and 
made annual divisional targets through the setting of divisional budgets. Thirdly, performance 
against annual targets was reported monthly. Finally, individual partner revenue and related 
financial statistics were reported at the same time. Moreover, as Brian suggested, partners were 
expected to compare themselves, and their divisions, with others in the firm. Comparison was 
taken to imply inter-partner competition, and experienced as the need to ‘keep up’: 
 
Jake: I think one becomes very conscious of the numbers in terms of the scrutiny, and 
needing to keep up with the Joneses…  And then there is an element of that feeling being 
imposed upon us… that is intentional. 
 
Hence, senior management’s gaze pointed at divisional and partner financial outcomes, and the 
visibility of such measures experienced by partners as a deliberate disciplinary intention. 
Partners recognised a clear link between metrics and career progression. High performance 
would be recognised at the firm’s remuneration committee when partner profit shares were set. 
Moreover, partners linked financial performance to promotion to equity and thereafter 
progression through lockstep. The following quotes illustrate these linkages: 
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Neil {Fixed share}: I check my matter managed [billings] a lot... Because to me that's the 
measure ultimately of what you are worth and your success here… And part of that is 
being driven by trying to move from being an FSP {Fixed Share Partner} [to equity]. 
  
Rory {Equity}: It's all about the stats. And the fact that’s obviously the main thing at 
partner review and in [the remuneration committee].  People want to progress to the top 
of equity, and they see the figures of others… and feel that they have to match that. 
 
Therefore, partners experienced metrics supporting the firm’s financialised strategy as central 
to their progression within the partnership structure and to the achievement of the aspirational 
career identity of equity partner, and from there through lockstep. This has a number of 
implications that we discuss below.   
 
Partner experiences of the financialised PSF: fear and anxiety  
The main implication of the link between careers and metrics is an ongoing obsession with 
performance that metrics assess. Professionals pursue partnership as part of a desired identity, 
itself an indicator of recognition, status and personal success (Brown and Coupland, 2015; Gill, 
2015). However, the challenge is now not only to reach partnership – the previous end of the 
career project. Intra-partnership there is a secondary hierarchy, the ‘core and mantle’ structure 
(Galanter and Henderson, 2008) which separates fixed share and equity partners.  Within 
equity, partners are ranked by the firm’s lockstep, resulting in many more stages in the career 
project.  Kyle, a partner on top of equity, described the effect: 
 
Once you are a partner, and then you are an equity partner, you've achieved those sort of 
badges of honour if you like.  Equity is invisible to most people apart from the other 
partners.  It’s your progression…  It's your mark of progress…  
 
‘Top equity’ status is, therefore, pursued as a project of the self (Grey, 1994) in which each 
promotion, and step on lockstep, creates an ‘identity deficit’: further progressions are necessary 
to achieve the ultimate goal (Karreman and Alvesson, 2009): 
 
Ken: [What’s more important is] being top of lockstep. It's being recognised. Someone 
saying that: gosh, within the framework that we've got here, I recognise that you are top 
performing. 
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Neil: [What is more important is] [p]rogression on the lockstep. From a recognition point 
of view that what I am doing is valued by others… that's a reflection of appreciation and 
reward from your fellow partners. And from the management team. 
 
Hence, partners share the view that recognition of value to the firm, evidenced by equity 
appointment and progression, is a fundamental signifier of career ‘success’. Those not reaching 
top equity thus see that as failing to achieve their career goal: 
 
Terry: {Resigned tone} [I]f I leave Henley Benson, not having made top lockstep… I will 
think: well I didn't quite make it.  I wasn't quite one of the top guys at Henley Benson. Of 
course, that's the whole point of setting up these structures. To get people to strive for 
these things. 
 
Sonya: {Indicating frustration and disappointment} I think there is a perception of some 
partners being more important and contributing more to the firm than others… a team of 
super partners who are the full equity partners… 
 
References to partners as ‘top guys’ or ‘super partners’ confirms top lockstep as the 
manifestation of an ‘elite’ identity (Brown and Coupland, 2015; Gill, 2015) sought after by 
partners. 
 
The now ‘elastic tournament’ (Galanter and Henderson, 2008) and the extending of the career 
project creates two overlapping but distinct experiences for many partners: fear and anxiety. 
Dealing firstly with fear, partners live in a constant state of fear of failure, as defined by the 
metrics. Fear denotes a ‘dread of impending disaster and an intense urge to defend oneself’ 
which results from an ‘identifiable external stimulus’ (Ohman, 2008, p. 710). An equity partner 
(Jordan) referenced fear as a motivating factor during her partner review in response to 
comments made by the Managing Partner (James): 
 
James: [S]omething you are recognised for being really good at… [is] business 
development… 
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Jordan: It's fear! It's the fear! I've been there, I've had no work… You might think I'm 
joking, I'm not! It's the fear.  When I started at {firm X} I had no clients, I had no work. 
Necessity is the mother of invention. 
 
Here Jordan characterised her pursuit of business development initiatives as a necessity; it 
being a disciplinary reaction to the performance regime, a means to winning work and 
generating billings, the latter regarded as a must to maintain her equity position and career 
progression.  Terry also described a continuing fear: 
 
[Y]ou never know quite what is coming next… [Y]ou could be tapped on the shoulder 
and told: you are doing really well. Or you could be tapped on the shoulder and told: you 
are doing so badly that you are coming down the [lockstep].  And where is the next place 
going to be? That is a structure which [the chairman and managing partner] would say, 
drives performance.   It’s fear that… drives performance… That's my reality… 
 
Both Jordan and Terry perceive a failure to meet performance expectations as a threat to their 
continuing position.  Lesley explained how one would come to be ‘tapped on the shoulder’: 
 
[I]f you were an outlier you would get the tap on the shoulder from [the chairman or 
managing partner] and a ‘chat’… presumably your equity is about to be chopped or ‘here's 
the door’. 
 
Being an ‘outlier’ is a pejorative form of othering, suggesting that the individual is no longer 
part of the group of partners seen to be holding their own, or ‘keeping up’ {cf Jake: above}.  
Equity being ‘chopped’ is a reference to having equity points reduced, a form of career 
regression. ‘Here’s the door’ is even more extreme: removal from the partnership altogether.  
This threat hangs over even the top performing partners: 
 
Donald: [M]y biggest driver is insecurity. It's fear of being out of a job and not earning 
money…  Ken said to me recently: fuck sake Donald, you just need to relax a bit more!  
And I can't.  I genuinely can’t.  Fear of not performing and coming unstuck haunts me. 
 
Partners are therefore, to use Donald’s term, haunted by the fear of failure, i.e., the fear of 
underperformance against the metrics that disrupts the career project. This in turn leads to a 
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second experience of work and career in the financialised law firm: one of anxiety about what 
the future might hold. A temporal anxiety is created, being ‘a state of undirected arousal 
following the perception of threat.’ (Epstein, 1972, p. 311; in Ohman, 2008, p. 710). While fear 
is immediate – what will the next set of metrics show – anxiety results from the recurrent 
possibility ones future career could be derailed and the project of the self destroyed by an at 
present unforeseeable poor performance, even if current performance is good. This temporality 
is built into the way in which performance goals are set, assessed and reset. As each year passes, 
the performance in that year becomes historic.  The new year wipes the slate clean and there is 
a need to perform again.  And with the firm’s strategy focused on revenue growth, expanding 
budgetary demands result in continual partner anxiety about what might come next, even for 
those currently ‘making the numbers’. As two equity partners described: 
 
Jake: If I hit £{X} [in fees] I'm a couple of hundred [thousand] up on last year…  The 
tricky thing is the recurrent theme that we have the dread of what's coming – what’s the 
bar going to be at next year?  Is it Sergey Bubka height, you know? {Laughs} 
 
Zak: I got an email [confirming performance against budget at year end] and I saw we 
had done really well.  Rather than thinking, terrific, that's a great thing, I thought, shit! 
What's going to happen when I get back is that somebody is going to be saying we want 
you to do even more! 
 
This anxiety reflects Galanter and Henderson’s (2008) characterisation of the ‘elastic 
tournament’ for partnership, where ‘the duration of the tournament can now be expected to last 
one’s entire career’ such that ‘the only finish line is death or retirement’ (Galanter and 
Henderson, 2008, pp. 1871–1872). Even for top equity partners there is no escape from the 
constant pressure to perform; leading to anxiety about the possibility of losing the ontological 
security that comes with being in a stable career position (Collinson, 2003; Gill, 2015). This 
begs the question: how do partners respond to fear and anxiety? Do they assimilate 
financialised management in ways that allow them to protect their interests?  
 
Career protection and the contradictions of metric driven professional work 
As already noted, Henley Benson’s partners argue that senior management are solely or 
primarily interested in driving financial outcomes. However, the written criteria applied to 
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partner appointments, and in partner and remuneration committee review, include a number of 
other forms of ‘contribution’, including participation in the management of the firm, the 
training of junior professionals and, pertinent here, is the requirement for partners to be ‘good 
citizens’. The Chairman explained: 
 
Good citizens means… [partners] are not elbowing other people just to achieve their own 
ends.  That they work in a supportive collegiate way with people in their team, and with 
other partners in the firm.  That they don't grab work… [but] will genuinely support the 
right person in the firm to do a piece of work, even if it means that it impacts adversely 
on their own figures. 
 
In many ways the description of ‘good citizens’ corresponds with the criteria for promotion to 
partnership in the era before the managerialisation of PSFs. Described earlier in the literature 
review, partnership in this earlier era was awarded based on contribution to the collective and 
time served. Hence, it was tied to developing the firm as a whole and not just individual 
financial performance. In Henley Benson the ‘sediments’ (Cooper et al., 1996)  of this approach 
remain, reflected in what partners described as the ‘soft’ performance measures associated with 
citizenship as set out above. However, as a Division Head explained, measuring such 
performance is much more difficult that measuring financial performance:   
 
Jonathan: [Financial statistics are] where the focus is…  It's much more complicated to 
share the softer stuff.  If you have brought in a client for the benefit of the firm, you have 
passed it on to so-and-so, or you have made cross referrals, that's probably more difficult.  
We are pretty ruthlessly driven and focused on financials… 
 
As a result, while apparently recognising the benefits of citizenship, Henley Benson partners, 
who experience the fear and anxiety of discipline by financial metrics, judge themselves and 
others solely or primarily in financial terms. As one partner noted: 
 
Alex: [W]hen… I can’t see what a… partner… [is] doing to build the business, what 
clients they are bringing in… or how they are scored in the 360° appraisals, when my 
only visibility of how they are doing is the monthly report that shows their matter 
[manager] numbers… if that is the only measure I am seeing then that is how I am gonna 
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class them.  And likewise if… that's the only thing that everyone sees that’s uniform then 
it's important to me that those are good figures… 
 
Confirming the pre-eminence of financial metrics, partners perceive those producing high fee 
levels as immune to sanction for poor performance in corporate citizenship: 
 
Jake: I'm sure citizenship is important but … [t]he reality is that if you are a complete 
tube and you are bringing in £{X} million a year then nobody is really going to give too 
much of a monkeys that you're not…  There is an awful lot of acceptance of bad 
behaviour…  You wouldn't be binning the stars. 
 
Here the ‘stars’, also known as ‘rainmakers’ (Hanlon, 2004; Galanter and Henderson, 2008), 
are those who bring in substantial fee income.  Disciplining them could lead to their departure, 
which would in turn damage the firm’s revenue generation and senior management’s chances 
of delivering the strategy. Jake’s view is reflected in the Chairman’s candid admission: 
 
Interviewer: Does financial performance trump behavioural issues? 
Ken:  Unfortunately in some instances it does. That's not something I'm proud of… 
 
Hence, in the financialised PSF, performance that supports the delivery of a strategy built on 
revenue growth comes with forgiveness of breaches of ‘soft’ performance criteria, and the 
traditional logics of professionalism. Any contradiction in assessments between the measurable 
and the immeasurable is resolved by privileging the numbers. 
 
Consequently, partners engage in a series of career protection strategies incompatible with 
ideas of good citizenship. Career protection involves four reactions by partners: empire 
building, work siloing, bloating and blocking.  Empire building in this context is the practice 
of aggressively expanding the number of client relationships for which a partner assumes 
responsibility, hence placing him as the ‘first port of call’ for that client, and thereby able to 
determine who does the resulting work. Work siloing is where a partner discharges work even 
when it does not fall within his specialist knowledge. This happens because the individual is 
then credited with the fees for the work as matter manager, supporting his position in the intra-
firm economic competition between partners. Hence, individuals, and the work that comes to 
them, falls into silos rather than distributed to those best placed to undertake it. This becomes 
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a case of bloating when the partner generates fees at a level that is considerably above that 
which might otherwise be regarded as needed to maintain his position, prompting others to 
follow suit in order to keep up. Blocking occurs when partners prevent others from accessing a 
source of work or a development opportunity, as described at a discussion during an informal 
partners’ lunch: 
 
Jake: People are very protective of their own positions. Terry… was fighting tooth and 
nail to make sure that Jennifer couldn’t go on to the… sector focus group. 
Nathan: Why? 
Jake: …  Terry is lagging behind the rest of us this year in terms of his numbers. And 
that's the bottom line. He was passively aggressively trying to block Jennifer. 
 
Here Terry’s behaviour arises from a fear of ‘lagging behind’ in the race to prove continuing 
economic value to the firm. The partners are all too aware of the contradiction created, as noted 
by two interviewees: 
 
Finlay: I sense within partners that, because reporting is very heavily matter manager 
driven, that's the thing you see… the partners look at that as a league table… leading to 
what I think of as negative behaviours, which is aggressive matter manager bloating… 
aggressively seeking to get their share of the divisional pie higher rather than looking out 
to grow the division’s as a whole. 
 
Rory: The business model we are operating isn't right. All you ever see month on month 
are financial statistics. So I compare myself to others and say: I'm ahead of him, him and 
him, great, but behind him. Others must do the same. It just builds matter manager silos. 
 
Hence Finlay and Rory experience the focus on statistics, and the matter manager billing metric 
in particular, as a driver of internal partner-to-partner economic competition (Galanter and 
Henderson, 2008). Partners check and compare their revenue figures to their peers, competing 
with one another on what amounts to a financial league table at the expense of other 
performance criteria, and citizenship in particular. Consequently, whereas the published 
criteria for partner assumption, promotion and review encourage the handing-on of chargeable 
work to others seen to be better qualified to perform the task, the firm’s financial focus 
promotes a maximisation of each partner’s own billings. Most fundamentally, it encourages 
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practices that contradict the logic of professional partnerships and those values that previous 
studies have suggested are preserved by the assimilation of managerial interventions by 
professionals. The reason for this contradiction is simple. By passing on work, perhaps to a 
partner more experienced in the subject of the work, a partner is acting as a ‘good citizen’ and 
ensuring the strength of the whole partnership, this being the ‘traditional’ professional fiduciary 
logic (Freidson, 2001). However, he is also passing up the opportunity to improve his 
measurable performance against a key financial metric and potentially damaging his career 
prospects. In light of the fear and anxiety outlined above, this dilemma is resolved in favour of 
the financial metric. As a result, partners are captured by financial metrics, this preventing 
them assimilating metrics in ways that support the distinctive logics of the professions. 
 
Conclusions 
This article is set in the context of a professional organisation in which financialization is 
operationalised through disciplinary technologies applied to partners. It adds to our 
understanding of financialization in the PSF, moving beyond the employed professionals 
studied by scholars such as Karreman & Alvesson (2009), Brown and Lewis (2011), Alvehus 
and Spicer (2012) and Cushen (2013) into the hitherto underexplored but important realm of 
the partner and the effects on their careers. It shows that the kinds of impacts of financialization 
on professional employees outlined by Cushen (2013), namely insecurity and work 
intensification, are also experienced by partners but in a very particular way relating to their 
career projects. Given partners are the co-owners of the law firm in question it is surprising 
and important to note this extension of the impact of financialization onto them. In particular, 
our findings extend the work of Cushen (2013) by identifying the mechanisms (see Figure 1) 
through which metrics discipline partners, generate experiences of ontological insecurity and 
influence their career strategies. This meso-micro level of analysis goes beyond Cushen’s 
(2013) focus on structures and outcomes by accounting for the lived experiences and resultant 
behaviours of partners. We also as we outline below use our analysis to extend work on 
professional autonomy.   
 
In terms of understandings of the effects of managerialism and financialization, our findings 
also contrast with those of earlier studies that found professionals able to assimilate 
technologies of managerialisation to further their own interests (Faulconbridge and Muzio 
2008; Freidson, 1984; Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd, 2003). Earlier studies of organisational 
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professionalism (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2008) and the rise of the MPB (Cooper et al., 1996) 
have emphasised respectively the assimilation of financial priorities to meet professional ends 
and persistent sediments of professional logics such as autonomy and control over work. The 
findings of our analysis suggest that financialised management strategies have now extended 
their influence to the point that assimilation is difficult if not impossible, and the sediments of 
the logics of professionalism have limited meaningful effects on the practices of professionals. 
In particular, we reveal the mechanisms by which financialised management captures partners 
and undermines professional logics. Figure 1 outlines these mechanisms. It reveals the way 
metrics generate fear and anxiety that is associated with ontological insecurity with regard to 
career projects. This then results in career protection strategies being deployed which respond 
to the pre-eminence of financial priorities, irrespective of the contradictions generated in 
relation to professional values. The outcome is prioritisation of individual financial 
performance over good citizenship and professional collegiality, and the success of one’s 
career project over the performance of the partnership. 
 
{Figure 1 here} 
 
The capture of professionals by financialised management has fundamentally transformed 
what it means to be a professional partner in the law firm studied. We believe that many 
parallels can be drawn with partners on other PSFs such as accountancy, architecture etc. These 
organisations share many of the underlying logics that are present in law firms, including 
autonomy and trust, while facing similar pressures from clients for more value-driven solutions 
that push those firms towards market logics (e.g. Ahuja et al., 2017). In principle therefore, our 
model could be applicable in those organisations. Nevertheless, this raises a series of future 
research questions in relation to how we theorise the professional work within financialised 
organisations.  First, the extent to which the experience of partners in other PSFs mirrors those 
of lawyers deserves attention to test the wider applicability of our findings. Given the 
accounting underpinnings of financialization we might expect accountancy firms to be ahead 
of the curve when it comes to not only the adoption of metricised controls, but also the 
countering of any career protection strategies that might have arisen and which are considered 
to have a negative impact. Revealing how accountancy firms have applied controls, and 
responded to such strategies would add depth to our model and may reveal how law firms and 
their partners may follow. Architects, while sharing professional underpinnings with 
accountancy firms, are said to place emphasis on the image of the architect as embodying 
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individual creative talent while the architectural firms themselves face stiffening competition 
and client value-driven demands (Ahuja et al., 2017). There are parallels here with lawyers and 
autonomy, but departures too which merit independent study. Moreover, variations between 
law firms would also be worth examining: to what extent are the mechanisms documented here 
replicated across larger or smaller, more or less international firms? Second, the wider 
ramifications for professional logics deserve attention. In particular, underlying professional 
logics is the claim that clients’ interests are best served when professionals are free from 
financial and managerial pressures (Freidson, 1984). This suggests that it is important to 
consider whether the career protection strategies documented here could potentially undermine 
client service quality, or even lead to ethical concerns, as partners seek to protect their financial 
performance, potentially at the expense of their ethical duties. For example, might the issue of 
client capture (Gustafsson et al., 2018) (when professionals fail to uphold their fiduciary 
responsibilities because of an overly-close/dependent relationship with clients) be exaggerated 
by financialised management?  
 
Third, our study of professionals raises some interesting questions about partners that take on 
managerial roles, and then impose the new regime on other professionals. The idea of the 
hybridised professional (Noordegraaf, 2007), where professionals take on managerial roles in 
conjunction with their professional practices, has attracted interest in recent years. McGivern 
et al. (2015) elaborate on this approach by differentiating between ‘incidental hybrids’, who 
temporarily take on hybrid roles but seek to protect traditional notions of professionalism, and 
‘willing hybrids’, who develop a more concerted professional-managerial identity. Our study 
raises an important question in relation to these debates: can the senior management of our case 
study firm be conceived of as hybrids? Their emphasis on financial metrics, and willingness to 
allow financial concerns to trump citizenship and associated professional logics, should prompt 
us to question the extent to which professional and managerial logics coexist within former 
practitioners who have assumed senior management roles. This suggests that the extent to 
which managers in financialised PSFs genuinely display hybrid tendencies needs further 
investigation.  
 
Finally, although beyond the scope of this article, there is merit in investigating the gender and 
wider equality effects of the financialization of PSFs, and in particular the extent to which the 
career protection strategies we outline, or the consequences of such strategies, have gender and 
diversity implications in such firms. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Type of Partner/Function Head Number interviewed 
Chairman 1 
Managing Partner 1  
GSB Members 4  
Operations Board Members 6  
Departmental Heads 3  
Division Heads 5  
Line Partners 19  
Function Heads 3  
Table 1: Interviewees split by type  
 
Documents 
Strategy and Operations Board papers and minutes 
Partners’ Conference papers 
Divisional meeting papers and minutes 
Explanatory documents for relevant management systems and processes e.g. 
 Partner appointment and criteria 
 Partner review and objective setting 
 Remuneration committee 
Table 2: Documentary review 
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